Complexity and financial panics by Caballero, Ricardo J. & Simsek, Alp
MIT LIBRARIES DUPL
'lllllllilliiilllllilll '
DEWEY'-
3 9080 03317 5925
Massachusetts Institute of Technology
Department of Economics
Working Paper Series
Complexity and Financial Panics
Ricardo J. Caballero
Alp Simsek
Working Paper 09-17
May 15, 2009
RoomE52-251
50 Memorial Drive
Cambridge, MA 02142
This paper can be downloaded without charge from the
Social Science Research Network Paper Collection at
httsp://ssm.com/abstract= 14 14382

Complexity and Financial Panics
Ricardo J. Caballero and Alp Simsek*
May 15, 2009
Abstract
During extreme financial crises, all of a sudden, the financial world that was once
rife with profit opportunities for financial institutions (banks, for short) becomes
exceedingly complex. Confusion and uncertainty follow, ravaging financial markets
and triggering massive flight-to-quality episodes. In this paper we propose a model
of this phenomenon. In our model, banks normally collect information about their
trading partners which assures them of the soundness of these relationstdps. How-
ever, when acute financial distress emerges in parts of the financial network, it is not
enough to be informed about these partners, as it also becomes important to learn
about the health of their trading partners. As conditions continue to deteriorate,
banks must learn about the health of the trading partners of the trading partners
of the trading partners, and so on. At some point, the cost of information gathering
becomes too unmanageable for banks, uncertainty spikes, and they have no option
but to withdraw from loan commitments and illiquid positions. A fiight-to-quality
ensues, and the financial crisis spreads.
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1 Introduction
The dramatic rise in investors' and banks' perceived uncertainty' is at the core of the 2007-
2009 U.S. financial crisis. All of a sudden, a financial world that was once rife with profit
opportunities for financial institutions (banks, for short), was perceived to be exceedingly
complex. Although the subprime shock was small relative to the financial institutions'
capital, banks acted as if most of their counterparties were severely exposed to the shock.
Confusion and uncertainty followed, triggering the worst case of flight-to-quality that we
have seen in the U.S. since the Great Depression.
In this paper we present a model of the sudden rise in complexity, followed by wide-
spread panic in the financial sector. In the model, banks normally collect information
about their direct trading partners which serves to assure them of the soundness of these
relationships. However, when acute financial distress emerges in parts of the financial
network, it is not enough to be informed about these partners, but it also becomes impor-
tant for the banks to learn about the health of their trading partners. And as conditions
continue to deteriorate, banks must learn about the health of the trading partners of the
trading partners, of their trading partners, and so on. At some point, the cost of informa-
tion gathering becomes too large and banks, now facing enormous uncertainty, have no
option but to withdraw from loan commitments and illiquid positions. A flight-to-quality
ensues, and the financial crisis spreads.
The starting point of our framework is a standard liquidity model where banks (rep-
resenting financial institutions more broadly) have bilateral linkages in order to insure
against local liquidit}' shocks. The whole financial system is a complex network of link-
ages which functions smoothly in the environments that it is designed to handle, even
though no bank knows with certainty all the many possible connections within the net-
work (that is, each bank knows the identities of the other banks but not their exposures).
However, these linkages may also be the source of contagion when an unexpected event
of financial distress arises somewhere in the network. Our point of departure with the
literature is that we use this contagion mechanism not as the main object of study but
as the source of confusion and financial panic. During normal times, banks only need to
understand the financial health of their neighbors, which they can learn at low cost. In
contrast, when a significant problem arises in parts of the network and the possibility of
cascades arises, the number of nodes to be audited by each bank rises since it is possible
that the shock may spread to the bank's counterparties. Eventually the problem becomes
too complex for them to fully figure out, which means that banks now face significant
uncertainty and they react to it b}' retrenching into liquidity-conservation mode.
This paper is related to several strands of literature. There is an extensive literature
that highlights the possibilitjf of network failures and contagion in financial markets.
An incomplete list includes Allen and Gale (2000), Lagunoff and Schreft (2000), Rochet
and Tirole (1996), Freixas, Parigi and Rochet (2000), Leitner (2005), Eisenberg and Noe
(2001), Cifuentes, Ferucci and Shin (2005) (see Allen and Babus (2008) for a recent
survey). These papers focus mainly on the mechanisms by which solvency and liquidity
shocks may cascade through the financial network. In contrast, we take these phenomena
as the reason for the rise in the complexity of the environment in which banks make
their decisions, and focus on the effect of this complexity on banks' prudential actions.
In this sense, our paper is related to the literature on flight-to-quality and Knightian
uncertainty in financial markets, as in Caballero and Krishnamurthy (2008), Routledge
and Zin (2004) and Easley and O'Hara (2005); and also to the related literature that
investigates the effect of new events and innovations in financial markets, e.g. Liu, Pan,
and Wang (2005), Brock and Manski (2008) and Simsek (2009). Our contribution relative
to this literature is in endogenizing the rise in uncertainty from the behavior of the financial
network itself. More broadly, this paper belongs to an extensive literature on flight-to-
quality and financial crises that highlights the connection between panics and a decline in
the financial system's ability to channel resources to the real economy (see, e.g., Caballero
and Kurlat (2008), for a survey).
We build our argument in several steps. In Section 2 we describe the normal envi-
ronment, characterize the financial network, and describe a rare event as a perturbation
to the structure of banks' shocks. Specifically, one bank suffers an unfamiliar liquidity
shock for which it was unprepared. In Section 3, we show that if banks can costlessly
gather information about the network structure, the spreading of this shock into precau-
tionary responses by other banks is typically contained. This scenario with no network
uncertainty is the benchmark for our main results.
In Section 4 we make information gathering costlv- In this context, if the cascade is
small, either because the liquidity shock is limited or because banks' buffers are significant,
banks are able to gather the information they need about their indirect exposure to the
liquidity shock and we are back to the full information results of Section 3. However,
once cascades are large enough, banks are unable to collect the information they need
to rule out a severe indirect hit. Their response to this uncertainty is to retrench on
their lending, which triggers a credit crunch. In Section 5 we show that under certain
conditions, the response in Section 4 can be so extreme, that the entire financial system
can collapse as a result of the fiight to quality. Somewhat paradoxically, this extreme
response is more likely to take place in a developed financial market than in one with
limited precautionary options for banks. The paper concludes with a final remarks section
and several appendices.
2 The Environment
In this section we introduce the environment and the characteristics of the financial net-
work. We first describe the normal scenario in which the financial network facilitates
liquidity insurance. We then introduce a perturbation to this environment: A shock
which was unanticipated at the network formation stage (i.e. the financial network was
not designed to deal with this shock).
2.1 The Normal Environment
There are four dates { — 1,0,1,2}. There is a single good (one dollar) that serves as
numeraire, which can be kept in liquid reserves or it can be loaned to production firms.
If kept in liquid reserves, a unit of the good yields one unit in the next date. Instead, if a
unit is loaned to firms at date -1, it then yields R > 1 units at date 2 if it is not recalled
or unloaded before this date. The loans have a recall option at date but at date 1 they
lose this option and become illiquid: One unit of loan recalled at date yields one unit
to the lender. At date 1, the loan cannot be recalled, but the lender can unload the loan
(e.g. by settling it with the borrower at a discount) and receive r < 1 units. To simplify
the notation, we assume r « throughout this paper.
The economy has 2n continuums of banks denoted by {b^}
'l-^- Each of these continu-
ums is composed of identical banks and, for simplicity, we refer to each continuum 6^ as
bank b^ , which is our unit of analysis.' At the beginning of date —1, each bank b' has
assets which consist of y units of liquid reserves and I — y units of loans, and liabilities
which consist of a measure one of demand deposit contracts. A demand deposit contract
pays /] > 1 if the depositor is hit by a liquidity shock and /o > /i if the depositor is not
hit by a liquidity shock. Let u)^ G [0, 1] be the measure of liquidity-driven depositors of
bank fr' (i.e. the size of the liquidity shock experienced by the bank), which takes one of
the three values in {uj.lol^ujh} with loh > ^l and Gj = [ujh + tj^,) /2, and suppose
y = liuj and [1 — y) R = I2CJ
so that the bank has assets just enough to pay /j (resp. I2) to early (resp. late) depositors
'The only reason for the continuum is for banks to take other banks' decisions as given.
if the size of the shock is u.
However, the hquidity needs at date 1 may not be evenly distributed among banks.
There are three aggregate states of the world, denoted by s (0), s (r) and s {g), revealed at
date 0. In state s (0) all banks expect to receive at date 1 the same liquidity shock O. The
states s (r) and s (g) are realized with equal probability and the liquidity shocks in these
states are heterogeneous across banks. More specifically, the banks in this economy are
divided half and half between two types: red and green. In state s (r) (resp. s (g)), the
banks with red type (resp. green type) expect to receive a high liquidity shock, Uf^, and
the other banks expect to receive a low liquidity shock, Ui. This means that in states s (r)
and s (g) there is enough aggregate liquidity but there is a need to transfer liquidity across
banks, which highlights one of the (many) reasons for an interlinked financial network.
Given the financial network, banks make arrangements to transfer liquidity in states
s (r) and s {g) through bilateral demand deposit contracts signed at date —1. In particular,
let i G {!,.., 2n} denote slots in a financial network and consider a permutation p :
{1,..,277} -^ {l,...2n} that assigns bank 6''^'' to slot i. We consider a financial network
denoted by:
b (p) = (6^(^) ^ fe'^f^) ^ ^p(3) _ ^ f,p(2n) _ ^.(D) .(J)
where the arc —> denotes that the bank in slot i (i.e., bank 6''*'') has a demand deposit in
the bank in the subsequent slot i + I (i.e., bank 6''''''"^' ) equal to
•
.
.
.
.
2 = (w - wl) , . (2)
where we use modulo 2n arithmetic for the slot index i.' We refer to bank 6''('+i^ as the
forward neighbor of bank 6^^'^ (and similarly, to bank 6''^*' as the backward neighbor of
bank bP^'+^^ ).
We say that the financial network is consistent if all odd slots (resp. all even slots)
contain banks of the same type, which means that red and green type banks alternate
around the financial circle. For analytical simplicity, we restrict the set of feasible networks
to consistent ones (as opposed to, for example, any circular network in which banks may
be arbitrarily ordered around the circle), since these networks ensure that each bank that
needs liquidity has deposits on a bank with excess liquidity, facilitating bilateral liquidity
insurance (see below) with the minimally required level of cross-deposits ~.
Next we introduce three features —network uncertainty, auditing, and loan recall
—
^In particular, i represents the slot with index i' £ {l,..,2n} that is the modulo 2?! equivalent of
integer i. For example, i = 2n -\- 1 represents the slot with index 1.
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that play no role in the normal environment but that will prove central during a rare
event (defined as a perturbation to the normal environment).
Network uncertainty
Banks' tj-pes and the financial network are realized at date —1 as follows: First the types
of banks are realized at random (half of the banks become red type and the other half
green type); then a particular consistent financial network h [p] (with respect to these
types) is realized. We define
B={h{p)
I
p : {1, ... 2n} -^ {1, .., 2n} is a permutation}
,
as the set of consistent financial networks from an ex-ante point of view (i.e. before the
types of the banks are realized) and we suppose:
Assumption (FS). Each bank has a prior belief /-' (.) over B with full support.
Once the types are realized and a consistent financial network forms, each bank IP observes
its slot ? = p~^ (j) and the identities (and types) of the banks in its neighboring slots z — 1
and 2 + 1. This information narrows down the potential networks to the set:
B^p) = {h{p)eB
p{t-l)^p{t-l)
p{i) ^ p{i)
p{i + l) = p{i + l)
where t = p ^ {j)
Note that the bank b^ does not know the types of the remaining banks
(^),rf{p(j_i) p(i) p{j+i)}i i^or does it know how these banks are assigned to the remaining
slots (see Figure 1). The latter means, and this is critical, that banks do not know how
these banks are connected to all other banks in the network.
Auditing Technology
Each bank tP can acquire more information about the financial network through an au-
diting technology. At the beginning of date and after the realization of the aggregate
state in {s [0) , s {r) ,s [g)}, a bank LP in slot i (i.e. with j — p {i)) can exert efi"ort to
audit its forward neighbor f^^'^^'^ in order to learn the identity of this bank's forward
neighbor ?/'('+2) . Continuing this way, a bank b^ that audits a number, a^ , of balance
sheets learns the identity of its a-' + I forward neighbors and narrows the set of potential
Figure 1: The financial network and uncertainty. The bottom-left box displays the
actual financial network. Each circle corresponds to a slot in the financial network, and in
this realization of the network, each slot i contains bank b^ (i.e. p (?') = i). The remaining
boxes show the other networks that bank b^ finds plausible after observing its neighbors
(i.e. the set B^ (p)). Bank b^ cannot tell the types of banks b^,b'^,b^, nor can it tell how
they are ordered in slots i £ {3, 4, 5}.
financial networks to:
~p{i-l)=p{i-l)
BUp
I
a') = {h{p) eB
p{i + a^ + 1) = p{i + a^ + 1)
,
where i = p (j)
We denote the posterior behefs of bank tP with f^ {. \ p,a^) which has support equal to
B^ (/9, a^) gi\'en assumption (FS). In the example illustrated in Figure 1, if bank b^ audits
one balance sheet, then it would learn that bank 6^ is assigned to slot 3 and it would
narrow down the set of networks to the two boxes at the left hand side of the bottom row
in Figure 1.
^fc.'-
Loan Recalls
After learning about the aggregate state and narrowng the financial network ioB^ [p \ a^),
each bank tP has updated information about its liquidity needs at date 1. The bank can
rearrange its portfolio by recalling a portion of its loans yg € [0, yo] and by keeping these
units in liquid reserves. After this portfolio reallocation, each bank has y + y^Q 6 [y, y + yo]
invested in liquid reserves and 1 — y — yj^ in loans. The parameter yo E [0, 1 — y] captures
the flexibility of the banks in portfolio rearrangement. If yo = 0, the banks cannot recall
any loans, while if yo = 1 — y, the banks can recall all of the loans they made at date —1.
Bank Preferences
Consider a bank IP and denote the bank's actual payments to early and late depositors
by q'-y and q^ (which may in principle be different than the contracted values /i and /2).
Because banks are infinitesimal, they make decisions taking the payments of the other
banks as given. The bank makes the audit and loan recall decisions, a-' G {0, 1., .., 2n — 3}
and yo € [0, yo], at date 0. At date 1, the bank chooses to withdraw some of its deposits
on the neighbor bank, which we denote by z^
€ [0,;:], and it may also unload some of
its outstanding loans. The bank makes these decisions to maximize g^ until it can meet
its liquidity obligations to depositors, that is, until q\ — li. Increasing q[ beyond /i has
no benefit for the bank, thus once it satisfies its liquidity obhgations, it then tries to
maximize the return to the late depositors g^.
We capture this behavior with the followng objective function
V (1 {q>, <h]q>, + l{cf,> h]ci) - d [a^]
, (3)
where v : R+ —> IR++ is a strictly concave and strictly increasing function and d{.) is an
increasing and convex function which captures the bank's non-monetary disutility from
auditing. When the bank b^ is making a decision that would lead to an uncertain outcome
for (g^, g^) (which will be the case in Section 4), then it maximizes the expectation of the
expression in (3) given its posterior beliefs f^ (. | p, a^).
Suppose that the depositors' early/late liquidity shocks are observable, and a bank
which is able to pay its late depositors at least /i at date 2 can refuse to pay the late
depositors if they arrive early. "^ With this assumption, the continuation equilibrium for
bank IP at date 1 takes one of two forms. Either there is a no-liquidation equilibrium in
which the bank is solvent and pays
gl = h,qi>lu (4)
while the late depositors withdraw at date 2; or there is a liquidation equilibrium in which
the bank is insolvent, unloads all outstanding loans, and pa3's
qi<luqi = 0, , ,',/, (5)
while all depositors (including the late depositors) draw their deposits at date 1.
This completes the description of the normal environment with an uncertain financial
network. Figure 2 recaps the timeline of events in this economy. It can be checked, as we
do in the Appendix, that in equilibrium each bank b^ is solvent and pays its depositors
the contracted values, qi = li and q2 — I2, in each state of the world s (0) , s (r) and s (g).
In states s (r) and s [g], the banks in need of liquidity meet their liquidity demands by
withdrawing their deposits in their forward neighbor banks, and the banks with excess
liquidity do not withdraw their deposits in order to receive higher returns at date 2.
Moreover, the banks do not audit or recall any loans at date 0. The financial network
facilitates liquidity insurance and enables liquidity to flow across banks even though the
banks are uncertain about the network structure. In the next sections we show how things
change dramatically in the presence of a perturbation to this environment, especially when
banks face uncertainty about the financial network.
•'Without this assumption, there could be multiple equilibria for late depositors' early/late withdrawal
decisions. In cases with multiple equilibria, this assumption selects the equilibrium in which no late
depositor withdraws.
,
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Figure 2: Timeline of events.
2.2 A Rare Event
Henceforth we consider the equihbrium following an unanticipated change in the structure
of shocks: At date the banks learn that the actual state is s^ (0), which is just like s (0)
except for the fact that one bank, IP , becomes distressed and loses 6' < y of its liquid
assets. Figure 2 describes the timeline in the perturbed environment. We formally define
the equilibrium in this econon\y as follows.
Definition 1. The equilibrium^ is a collection of bank auditing, loan recall, deposit with-
drawal, and payment decisions {a^ [p) , yl [p) , z^ [p) ,q[[p), qi {p)\ \ such that, for
each consistent realization of the financial network b [p) at date —1 and the realization of
the unanticipated aggregate state s^ (0) at date 0, each bank IP maximizes expected utility
in (3) given its prior belief f^ (.) over B, the insolvent banks (with gj [p) < li) unload all
of their outstanding loans at date 1 and the late depositors withdraw deposits early if and
only if q2 (p) < h (cf- Eqs. (4) and (b)).
As we will see in the subsequent sections, the loan recall and auditing options become
useful in this scenario. The distressed bank tP does not have enough licjuid reserves to meet
the liquidity demand at date 1. This bank tries but cannot obtain liquidity from cross-
deposits (since the other banks do not have excess liquidity either), thus it benefits from
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recalling some of its loans at date 0. If the distressed bank is insolvent despite recalling
loans, it will pay less than li to its depositors, including its backward neighbor bank, and
the crisis will spread in this fashion to the other banks in the network. Anticipating this,
banks {V}j^j may also want to recall some loans. These banks may acquire additional
information about the financial network to make more accurate loan recall decisions. Note
that each bank IP ^ b^ knows that the bank IP is distressed, but it does not necessarily
know the slot
of the distressed bank. This is key, since it means that a bank V ^ V does not necessarily
know how far removed it is from the distressed bank.
More specifically, note that for each financial network b (p) and for each bank b^ , there
exists a unique /c 6 {0, .., 2n — 1} such that
j = p(j,-k),
which we define as the distance of bank tP from the distressed bank. As we will see, the
distance k will be the payoff relevant information for a bank 6-' that decides how many of
the loans to recall since it will determine whether or not the crisis that originates at the
distressed bank b' will cascade to bank V
.
The banks fc''(*-i), 6^(0^ 5p('+i)^ respectively with distances 1,0 and 2n — 1, know their
distances, but the remaining banks (with distances k £ {2, ..,2n — 2}) do not have this
information a priori and they assign a positive probability to each ^• G {2, .., 2n — 2} (they
rule out k 6 {l,2n — 1} by observing their forward and backwards neighbors). Note,
however, that the bank W can use the auditing technology to learn about the financial
network and, in particular, about its distance from the distressed bank. A bank b'^^'"'^'^
(wdth distance k) that audits a^ > 1 banks either learns its distance k [if k < a^ + 1) or
it learns that /c > a-' + 2.
We next turn to the characterization of equilibrium in the perturbed environment.
3 Free-Information Benchmark
We first study a benchmark case in which auditing is free so each bank b''^^"^^ chooses full
auditing a''^'"^^ = 2n — 3. In this context banks learn the whole financial network b (p)
and, in particular, their distances k.
All banks receive a liquidity shock, cj, and have liquid reserves equal to y = w/j, except
10.
for bank IP = b^^''' which has hquid reserves y — 9. At date 1, the distressed bank b^^'^
withdraws its deposits from the forward neighbor bank. As we show in the Appendix,
this triggers further withdrawals until, in equilibrium, all cross deposits are withdrawn.
That is ,
, ,
;
~j _ Vie{l,.„2n}.
, (6)
In particular, bank t'^''^ tries, but cannot, obtain an}' net liquidity through cross with-
drawals. The bank also cannot obtain any liquidity by unloading the loans at date 1,
since each unit of unloaded loan yields r w 0. Anticipating that it will not be able to
obtain additional liquidity at date 1, the distressed bank b''^'^ tries to obtain liquidity by
recalling some of its loans at date 0.
In order to promise late depositors at least /], a bank with no liquid reserves left at
the end of date 1 must have at least
l_,_5„"=ii^ (T)
units of loans. The level y^ is a natural limit on a bank's loan recalls (which plans to
deplete all of its liquidity at date 1) since any choice above this would make the bank
necessarily insolvent. If the actual limit on loan recalls yo'is greater than i/g, then the
bank can recall at most y^ loans while remaining solvent; or else it can recall j/o loans.
Combining the two cases, a bank's buffer is given by
P = min{yo,yo} •
A bank can accommodate losses in liquid reserves up to the buffer /?, but becomes insolvent
when losses are beyond /3. It foUows that the distressed bank 6^*'' will be insolvent
whene\'er
e > /?, (8)
that is, whenever its losses in liquid reserves are greater than its buffer. Suppose this is
the case so bank 6''''' is insolvent. Anticipating insolvenc}', this bank will recall as many
of its loans as it can j/q = yo (since it maximizes q^ ) and unloads all remaining loans
at date 1. Since the bank is insolvent, all depositors (including late depositors) arrive
early and the bank pays
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where recall that qf denotes bank fe'^^'^-^^'s payment to early depositors (which is equal
to h if bank bP^'+'^'^ is solvent).
Partial Cascades. Since bank 6^^'^ is insolvent, its backward neighbor bank 6''^'~-'^ will
experience losses in its cross deposit holdings, which, if severe enough, maj' cause bank
5p(''-i)'s insolvency. Once the crisis cascades to bank 6^''~^', it may then similarly cascade
to bank 6''^*~^\ continuing its cascade through the network in this fashion.
We conjecture that, under appropriate parametric conditions, there exists a threshold
K E {1, .., 2n - 2} such that all banks with distance k < K — I are insolvent (there are
K such banks) while the banks with distance k > K remain solvent. In other words, the
crisis will partially cascade through the network but wiU be contained after K < 2n — 2
banks have failed. We refer to K as the cascade size.
Under this conjecture, bank fe''('+^\ which has a distance 2n — 1, is solvent. Therefore
^p('+i)
_ i^ g^j^i^ ^p(0 jj-^ gq^ j^g-j ^^^ ]-)g calculated explicitl}^ Consider now the bank
5/'('-i)
^4th distance 1 from the distressed bank. To remain solvent, this bank needs to
pay ^1 on its deposits to bank i)^('^~2) but it receives only q^ < li on its deposits from the
distressed bank 6^^'\ so it loses z (li — q^ ) in cross-deposits. Hence, bank fo'^^'^i) will
also go bankrupt if and only if its losses from cross-deposits are greater than its buffer,
z ill — <f\ ) > 01 which can be rewTitten as
.. qt'^Kh-^. : : (10)
If this condition fails, then the only insolvent bank is the original distressed bank and the
cascade size is K = 1. If this condition holds, then bank 6^('~^) anticipates insolvency, it
will recall as many loans as it can, i.e. j/q = yo and it will pay all depositors
,
. \,r'>=f(^f')-
"^';^f" - . , (11)
From this point onwards, a pattern emerges. The payment by an insolvent bank b^'^^~'^^
(with /c > 1) is given by ' ' - ' .
'
p(r-fe) f ( p(r-(fc-i))'
and this bank's backward neighbor fe''*' C^'+i)) js also insolvent if and only if 7^ ' < Zi — 7
.
Hence, the payments of the insolvent banks converge to the fixed point of the function
12-
/ (.) given by y + yo, and if^
y + yo>li--, (12)
then (under Eq. (10)) there exists a unique A' > 2 such that
qf'""^ <h-'^ ioreachke {0,..J< -2} (13)
and gf-(^'-i)) >l,-^.
If 2n — 2 is greater than the solution, K, to this equation, i.e. if
2n - 2 > K, (14)
then, Eq. (13) shows that (in addition to the trigger-distressed bank b''^^^) all banks
l)P{'-k) Y^ith distance k E {I, .., K — 1} are insolvent since their losses from cross deposits
are greater than their corresponding buffers. In contrast, bank f^'"^^' (that receives
Qi from its forward neighbor) is solvent, since it can meet its losses from cross
deposits by recalling loans while still promising the late depositors at least li {i.e. q!^ >
/i). Since bank 6^('-^') is solvent, all banks b''^'-''^ with distance k 6 {A" + 1, ..,2n - 1}
are also solvent since they do not incur losses in cross-deposits. Hence these banks do not
recall any loans y^ = and pay (qj ' = h.q^ = '2), verifying our conjecture
for a partial cascade of size A' under conditions (12) and (14).
Since our goal is to study the role of network uncertainty in generating a credit crunch,
we take the partial cascades as the benchmark. The next proposition summarizes the
above discussion and also characterizes the aggregate level of recalled loans, which we use
as a benchmark in subsequent sections.
Proposition 1. Suppose the financial network is realized as h{p), auditing is free, and
conditions (8), (12) and (14) hold. Let i — p"^ (j) denote the slot of the distressed bank.
Then, the banks' equilibrium payments ((?i " ,(?2
'"
)
'^''^ (weakly) increasing with re-
spect to their distance k from the distressed bank, and there is a partial cascade of size
K < 2n — 2 where K is defined by Eq. (13). Banks {t''*'~''''}^^_o (luith distance from.
the distressed bank k < K — I) are insolvent while the remaining banks (f'''^'"'''}? ,,
(with distance k > K ) are solvent. Banks {6''*'"''"'},
_„ recall all of the loans they can
and unload all of the remaining loans at date 1, while banks {^^''"''"'j^.^,. do not recall
or unload any loans. Bank fc''''"'^' recalls a level of loans y^ = ; f /j — g^
'~
~ )
''if condition (12) fails, then the sequence iql = f [Qi
'"
~
) ) always remains below li — ^,
and it can be checked that there is a full cascade, i.e. all banks are insolvent.
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Figure 3: The free-information benchmark. The top figure plots tlie cascade size K
as a function of the losses in the originating bank 6, for different levels of the flexibility
parameter yo- The bottom figure plots the aggregate level of loan recalls, J-, for the same
set of {yo}-
which is just enough to m^eet its losses from cross deposits (and does not unload any
while all other solvent banks pay
Q'l' ' — h,Q2^'
'^'
= h]- The payments of the insolvent banks are determined by the
A'-l
loans). This bank pays
( gj = li,q2 '^ h
sequence I g^ = / Ui
p(l-(k-\)) Pil)
(9) after substituting q^
p(r+i)
fc=0
where the initial value q^ is solved from Eq
h-
The aggregate level of recalled loans is: '
yo + yo '15)
Discussion. Proposition 1 shows that the loan recall decisions and the payments of a
bank tP = 6''(*~'^) only depends on its distance k, and that the aggregate level of recalled
loans, T, is roughly linear in the size of the cascade K (and is roughly continuous in 6)
for an)' given level of yo- Figure 3 demonstrates this result for particular parameterization
of the model.
The top panel of the figure plots the cascade size K as a function of the losses in the
originating bank 6 for different levels of the flexibility parameter yo- This plot shows that
the cascade size is increasing in the level of losses 6 and decreasing in the level of flexibility
yo- Intuitivel)', with a higher 9 and a lower flexibility parameter yo, there are more losses
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to be contained and the banks have less emergency reserves to counter these losses, thus
increasing the spread of insolvency.
The bottom panel plots the aggregate level of loan recalls J^, which is a measure of
the severity of the credit crunch, as a function of 9. This plot shows that T also increases
with 9 and falls with yo- This is an intuitive result: In the free-information benchmark
only the insolvent banks (and one transition bank) recall loans, thus the more banks are
insolvent (i.e. the greater A') the more loans are recalled in the aggregate. Note also that
T increases "smoothly" with 9.
These results offer a benchmark for the next sections. There we show that once
auditing becomes costly, both K and JT may be non-monotonic in yo and can jump with
small increases \n 6.
4 Endogenous Complexity and the Credit Crunch
We have now laid out the foundation for our main result. In this section we add the
realistic assumption that auditing is costly and demonstrate that a massive credit crunch
can arise in response to an endogenous increase in complexity once a bank in the network
is sufficiently distressed. In other words, when K is large, it becomes too costly for banks
to figure out their indirect exposure. This means that their perceived uncertainty rises
and they eventually respond by recalling their loans as a precautionary measure (i.e., !F
spikes)
.
Note that, unlike in Section 3, we cannot simphfy the analysis by solving the equilib-
rium for a particular financial network b [p) in isolation, since, even when the realization
of the financial network is b(p), each bank also assigns a positive probability to other
financial networks b (p) G B. As such, for a consistent analysis we must describe the
equilibrium for any realization of the financial network h{p) (E B (cf. Definition 1).
Solving this problem in full generality is cumbersome but we make assumptions on the
form of the adjustment cost function, the banks' objective function, and on the flexibility
of the loan-recall limit, that help simplify the exposition. First, we consider a convex and
increasing cost function d[.) that satisfies
(i(l) = and d\2) > v{h + 12) - v{{))
.
(16)
This means that banks can audit one balance sheet for free but it is very costly to audit
the second balance sheet. In particular, given the bank's preferences in (3), the bank will
never choose to audit the second balance sheet and thus each bank audits exactly one
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balance sheet, {a^ (p) = !} . Given these audit decisions and the actual financial
L •'ih(p)sB
network b(p), a bank b^ has a posterior belief f^ (-l/O;!) with support B^ (/5,1), which is
the set of financial networks in which the bank j knows the identities of its neighbors
and its second forward neighbor. In particular, the bank bP^'-~'^'> learns its distance from
the distressed bank 6''^'' (in addition to banks 6''^'~-'^ 6^''', 6'"^'"'"^) which already have this
information from the outset of date 0). We denote the set of banks that know the slot of
the distressed bank (and thus their distance from this bank) by
Qknow / \ _ np{r-2) ^p(r-i) ^p{l) j^p(r+i)i
On the other hand, each bank b^^'"'^^ with k
€
{3,..,2n — 2} learns that its distance
is at least 3 (i.e. k > 3), but otherwise assigns a probability in (0, 1) to all distances
k G {3, .., 2n — 2}. We denote the set of banks that are uncertain about their distance by
^unceTtain / \
_ f ^p{T-3) f^/3(r-4) j^,3(i-(2n-2)) \
Second, we assume that the preference function v {.) in (3) is Leontieff v (x) =
(x^~°' — 1) / (1 — cr) with a —^ DO, so that the bank's objective is:
'
min {l{qi{~p)<h}cf,{p) + l{q\{p)>h}qi{p))-d{a^p)). (17)
b(p)eej(p,i)
This means that banks evaluate their decisions according to the worst possible network
realization, b{p), which they find plausible.
The third and last assumption is that
yo<yo- ' V (18)
That is, the actual limit on loan recalls is below the natural limit defined in Eq. (7)
(which also implies that the buffer is given by /3 = yo). This condition ensures that,
in the continuation equilibrium at date 1, the banks that have enough liquidity are also
solvent (since they have enough loans to pay the late depositors at least /] at date 2). We
drop this condition in the next section.
We next turn to the characterization of the equilibrium under these simplifying as-
sumptions. The banks make their loan recall decision at date and deposit withdrawal
decision at date 1 under uncertainty (before their date 1 losses from cross-deposits are
realized). At date 1 the distressed bank 6^''^ withdraws its deposits from the forward
neighbor which leads to the withdrawal of all cross deposits (see Eq. (6) and the Appen-
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dLx) as in the free-information benchmark. Thus, for any distressed bank, tlie only way
to obtain additional liquidity at date 1 is through ex-ante (date 0) loan recalls, which we
characterize next.
A Sufficient Statistic for Loan Recalls. Consider a bank 6^^'"'^' other than the
original distressed bank (i.e. suppose k > 0). A sufficient statistic for this bank to
make the loan recall decision is gj' ' ' (,5) < /j, which is the amount it receives in
equilibrium, from its forward neighbor. In other words, to decide how many of its loans
to recall, this bank only needs to know whether (and how much) it will lose in cross-
deposits. For example, if it knows with certainty that q[
'"
(p) — li (i.e. its forward
neighbor is solvent), then it recalls no loans j/q = 0. If it knows with certainty that
Qi [p] < li — ,3/z (i.e. its forward neighbor will pay so little that this bank will
also be insolvent), then it recalls as many loans as it can j/g — Vo- More generally,
if the bank 6''('~'^) chooses some y^ £ [0, yo] at date and its forward neighbor pays
X = q^ [p) Sit date 1, then this bank's payment can be written as
qf~'\~P) = qi[yi^] and qf^'\p)=q2[yix], (19)
where the functions qi [y'o^x] and q2 [y'o.x] are characterized in Eqs. (25) and (26) in the
Appendix. At date 0, the bank does not necessarily know x = q1 ~ [p) and it has to
choose the level of loan recalls under uncertainty.
The characterization in the Appendix also shows that q-[\y'Q,x] and qily'^.x] are
(weakly) increasing in x for any given y'^. That is, the bank's payment is increasing
in the amount it receives from its forward neighbor regardless of the ex-ante loan recall
decision. Using this observation along with Eq. (19), the bank's objective value in (17)
can be simplified and its optimization problem can be written as
max (1 {q, [y^, x'"] > h] q, [y',, x^'] + 1 {q, [y^, x^] > l,} q, [y'„ x^]) , (20)
s.t. .t'" = min lx\x = qP'^''''~'>> (p) , h(p) E B' (/9,1)
In words, a bank 6''''"'^' (with k > 0) recalls loans as if it will receive from its forward
neighbor the lowest -possible payment x^.
Distance Based and Monotonic Equilibrium. Next we define two equilibrium al-
location notions that are useful for further characterization. First, we say that the equi-
librium allocation is distance based if the bank's equilibrium payment can be written only
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as a function of its distance k from the distressed bank, that is, if there exists payment
functions Qi, (^2 : {0, .., 2n - 1} -^- R such that
ip),qf''Hp))-{Qi{k]
p{i-k)
for all h{p) E B and k e {0, ... 2n — 1}. Second, we say that a distance based equilibrium
is monotonic if the payment functions Qi [k] , Q2 [k] are (weakly) increasing in k. In words,
in a distance based and monotonic equilibrium, the banks that are further away from the
distressed bank yield (weakly) higher payments.
We next conjecture that the equilibrium is distance based and monotonic (which we
verif}' below). Then, a bank 6''*'~''"''s uncertainty about the forward neighbor's payment
X = Qi (p) = Qi[k — 1] reduces to its uncertainty about the forward neighbor's
distance k — 1, which is equal to one less than its own distance k. Hence, the problem
in (20) can further be simplified by substituting gj ^' ~ {p) = Qi [k — 1]. In particular,
since a bank b''^''~'^^ S Qknow ^-^^ ^^^j, /^ > g) knows its distance /c, it solves problem (20)
with x"' = Qi [/c- 1].
On the other hand, a bank &''('"''=) g ^uncertain f^p-^ assigns a positive probabihty to all
distances k G {3, ...,2n — 2}. Moreover, since the equilibrium is monotonic, its forward
neighbor's payment Qi /c — 1 is minimal for the distance /c = 3, hence a bank 6^^'' G
^uncertain
^^) g^j^gg problem (20) with .t'" = Qi [2].
We are now in a position to state the main result of this section, which shows that all
banks that are uncertain about their distances to the distressed bank recall loans as if they
are closer to the distressed bank than they actually are.
More specifically, all banks in ^""ce^*""' (^) recall the level of loans that the bank with
distance A; = 3 would recall in the free-information benchmark. When the cascade size is
sufficiently large (i.e. K > 3) so that the bank with distance /c = 3 in the free-information
benchmark would recall many of its loans, all banks in 5""cer(am ^^^ with actual distances
k > K also recall many of their loans, even though ex-post they end up not needing
liquidity.
To state the result, we let [y^jreeip) ^^i, free (p) ^^i. free (p)) denote the loan recall
decisions and payments of banks in the free-information benchmark for each financial
network h {p) <E B (characterized in Proposition 1).
Proposition 2. Suppose assumptions (FS), (16), and (17) are satisfied and conditions
(8), (12), (14), and (18) hold. For a given financial network h{p), let i = p~^ (j) denote
the slot of the distressed bank.
(i) For the continuation equilibrium (at date \): The equilibrium, allocation
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W(P)V2(P)},' is distance based and monotonic. The cascade size in the con-
h(p)eB
tinuation equilibrium is the same as in the free-information benchmark, that is, at date 1,
banks {^''^'~'^'}t_n ^^^^ insolvent while banks
{&''*'"''"* },_^ are solvent where K is defined
in Eq. (13).
(a) For the ex-ante equilibrium (at date 0): Each bank IP G B'^"°^ {p) recalls the same
level of loans y^ (p) = j/q .^^^ (p) as m the free-information benchmark, while each bank
V 6 5""'='"""" {p) recalls yl [p] = yJJ;/j {p) of its loans, which is what bank bP^''^^ would
choose in the free-information benchmark.
For the aggregate level of recalled loans, there are three cases depending on the cascade
size K:
If K < 2, then the crisis in the free-inform.ation benchmark would not cascade to bank
b'^''-^), which would recall no loans y^[^~^^ (/s) = 0. Thus, each bank b> e 5""'^^^*'''" (p)
recalls no loans and the aggregate level of recalled loans is equal to the benchmark Eq.
(15).
If K — 2), then the crisis in the free-information benchmark would cascade to and stop
at bank b^'^^'^^
,
which would recall an intermediate level of loans yQ l^J [p) € [0, yo] • Thus,
each bankbP G 5""'=^'"'°'" (p) recalls y^r^f.^ {p) of its loans and the aggregate level of recalled
loans is:
-^-Eyo = 3yo + (2n-4)<(;-t^. (21)
j
If K > 4, then in the free-information benchmark bank 6^''"'^' would be insolvent and
would recall as many of its loans as it can y^L^J — fjo- Thus, each bank tP e ^uncertain ^^^
recalls as many of their loans as they can and the aggregate level of recalled loans is:
J' = Y.yl = {2n-l)y,. (22)
The proof of this result is relegated to the appendix since most of the intuition is
provided in the discussion preceding the proposition. Among other features, the proof
verifies that the equilibrium allocation at date 1 is distance based and monotonic, and
that the cascade size is the same as in the free-information benchmark. The date
loan recall decisions are characterized as in part (ii) since the payments Qi [k — 1] for
/c
€ {1, 2, 271 - 1} (that a bank b^^'-^^ G 5'-'"°"' [p) with ^ > expects to receive) and the
payment Qi [2] (that the banks in ^""=6^''"" (p) effectively expect to receive) are the same
as their counterparts in the free-information benchmark.
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Figure 4: The costly-audit equilibrium. The top panel plots the cacade size K as
a function of the losses in the originating bank for different levels of the flexibility
parameter yQ. The bottom panel plots aggregate level of loan recalls F for the same set
of {yo}- The dashed lines in the bottom panel reproduce the free-information benchmark
in Figure 3 for comparison.
Discussion. The plots in Figure 4 are the equivalent to those in the free-information
case portrayed in Figure 3. The top panel plots the cascade size K as a function of
the losses in the originating bank 9. The parameters satisfy condition (18) so that the
cascade size in this case is the same as the cascade size in the free-information benchmark
characterized in Proposition 1, and both figures coincide.
The key differences are in the bottom panel, which plots the aggregate level of loan
recalls j^ as a function of 6. The solid lines correspond to the costly audit equilibrium
characterized in Proposition 2, while the dashed lines reproduce the free-information
benchmark also plotted in Figure 3. These plots demonstrate that, for low levels of K
(i.e. for K < ?)), the aggregate level of loan recalls with costly-auditing is the same as the
free-information benchmark, in particular, it increases roughly continuously with 6. As
K switches from below 3 to above 3, the loan recahs in the costly audit equilibrium make
a very large and discontinuous jump. That is, when the losses (measuring the severity of
the initial shock) are beyond a threshold, the cascade size becomes so large that banks
are unable to tell whether they are connected to the distressed bank. All uncertain banks
act as if they are closer to the distressed bank than they actually are, recalling many
more loans than in the free-information benchmark and leading to a severe credit crunch
episode. This is our main result.
20.
Note also that the aggregate level of loan recalls (and the severity of the credit crunch)
is not necessarily monotonic in the level of flexibility in loan recalls yo- For example,
when 9 = 0.5, Figure 4 shows that providing more flexibility to the banks by increasing
i/o actually increases the level of aggregate loan recalls. That is, at low levels of 6, an
increase in flexibility stabilizes the system but the opposite may take place when the
shock is sufficiently large. Intuitively, if the increase in flexibility is not sufficient enough
to contain the financial panic (by reducing the cascade size to manageable levels), niore
flexibilit}' backfires since it enables banks to recall more loans and therefore exacerbate
the credit crunch.
5 The Collapse of the Financial System
Until now, the uncertainty that arises from endogenous complexity affects the extent of
the credit crunch but not the number of banks that are insolvent. A'. In this section we
show that if banks have "too much" flexibility, in the sense that condition (18) no longer
holds and
yo e (%", 1 - y] (23)
(which also implies (3 = tJq), then the rise in uncertainty itself can increase the number of
insolvent banks.
The reason is that a large precautionary loan-recall compromises banks' long run
profitability by swapping high return R for low return 1. In this context, even if the
worst outcome anticipated by a bank does not materialize, it may still become insolvent
if sufficiently close (but farther than K) from the distressed bank. In other words, a
bank's large precautionary reaction improves its liquidation outcome when very close to
the distressed bank but it does so at the cost of raising its vulnerability with respect to
more benign scenarios. Since ex-post a large number of banks may find themselves in the
latter situation, there can be a significant rise in the number of insolvencies as a result of
the additional flexibility.
The analysis is very similar to that in the previous section. In particular, a bank's
payment still depends on its choice j/q € [0, yo] at date and its forward neighbor's
payment x = q^ {p) at date 1. That is:
qf"''^ [p] ^ gj [y^, x] and
g^''"''' [p] = q2 [y'o,x]
for some functions qi [y'o,x] and 92 [y'o,^]- However, the characterization of the piecewise
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functions q-[ [vq.x] and §2 [y'o^x] changes a little when condition (18) is not satisfied. In
particular, these functions are identical to those in (25) and (26) in the Appendix (as in
Section 4) but now there is an additional insolvency region:
y'o > Vo [ih -x)z].
The critical new element is the bound j/q [(/j — x) z]. This is a function of the losses
from cross-deposits and is calculated as the level of loan recalls above which the bank's
remaining loans and liquid reserves (net of losses) would not be sufficient to pay the late
depositors at least li . That is, j/q [(/i — x) z] is the solution to
Ril-y- yo" [(/: - x) z]) + y^ [{h - x) z] - {h - x) z = h {l - O)
.
We refer to scenarios where y^ > j/q [(/j — x) z] as, for lack of a better jargon, scenarios
of precautionary insolvency.
The functions gi [yo,x] and ^2 [y'o,^] remain (weakly) increasing in x. Moreover, we
conjecture as before that the equilibrium is monotonic and distance based (which we verify
below), so the banks' loan recall decisions still solve problem (20). It can be verified that
all banks (except potentially bank 6''^'"'"-'^) recall the level of loans as characterized in
part (h) of Proposition 2. In particular, all banks b^
€
5""<^erta2n
^-^^ choose the level of
insurance the bank with distance k — 3 would choose in the free-information benchmark.
However, part (i) of the proposition, which characterizes the equilibrium at date 1, changes
once yo exceeds y^. • .
We divide the cases by the cascade size: K < 2, K = 3, and K > 4. In the first
two of these cases there is no additional panic relative to the case where banks' flexibility
is hmited. If K < 2, each bank V e ^^"c'^rtain ^^^ y:ecal\s y^ = 0. The date 1 equilib-
rium in this case is as described in part (i) of Proposition 2, in particular, there are no
precautionary insolvencies and the cascade size is equal to A'. Similarly, if /(" = 3, each
bank b^
€
5""'=^^*'^'"
(p) recalls y^ = yg /7ee — ^o > where the inequality follows since the
transition bank 6^('~^) is solvent in the free-information benchmark. Since yo — ^O' it can
be seen that y^ < y^ [{h — x) z], so the banks in
_g""certain
^^^
^^^.g golvent.^ It follows that
there are no precautionary insolvencies and the equilibrium is again as described in part
(i) of Proposition 2, with a cascade size equal to A' — 3.
^To see this, first note that y^ < j/q ; which impHes
{R-l)yi<Ry^-yi = {l-y)R-^{l-0)h-yi,
where the equality follows from Eq. (7). Combining this inequality with the inequality j/q > (Zj — x)
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The new scenarios arise when K > 4. In this case, each bank IP 6 Q^ncertam ^^^ recalls
i/q — yo > Vo loans, and may experience a precautionary insolvency depending on its losses
from cross-deposits. Note also that, in this case, all banks b^ e {b^^'K ..., 6''^'"^^""^^^} recall
yo while bank 6''('+i) (which is the only informed bank far away from the distressed bank)
may recall a smaller amount.
To analyze this case, first note that the bound j/q [(/i — x) z] is decreasing in (/j — x) z,
and thus increasing in x. That is, the more a bank receives from its forward neighbor, the
higher the bound above which it will experience a precautionary insolvency. Second, note
the inequality, y^ [0] < 1 — y, which follows from some algebra and using I2/I1 < R- Then,
there are two subcases to consider depending on whether or not the flexibility parameter
yo is greater than y^ [0] (which is the highest value of the bound j/q [(^1 ~ ^) -])•
Subcase 1. If i/o is in the interval (j/q [0] , 1 — y], then yo is alwaj^s greater than the
upper bound y^ [(/i — .t) z] and a bank V experiences a precautionary insolvency regard-
less of the amount x it receives from its forward neighbor. In particular, all banks in
[f^'^ ..., ii''^'-(2"-2)) j g^j.g insolvent. It can be verified that the informed bank 6''('+i) averts
insolvency by choosing some j/q < yj (see the Appendix).
Subcase 2. If yo € (yo-J/o [0])) then there exists a unique x [yo] € {h — y^/zJi) that
solves
yo^[(/, -,r[yo])c] = yo. (24)
In this case, a bank V that has recalled yo loans is insolvent if and only if it receives from
its forward neighbor x < x [yo] (so that its upper bound y^ [{li — x) z] is below its loan
recalls yo). By a similar analysis to that in Section 3 for the partial cascades (which we
carry out in the Appendix), it can be checked that there exists K
€
[A', 2n — 1] such that
the banks jfe^*'*, .., 6''('-(^"^)) | are insolvent while the banks jfoK'-'^). .., 6''('-'2"-i))|
are solvent. In other words, there is a partial cascade which is at least as large as (and
potentially greater than) the partial cascade in the free-information benchmark.
We summarize our findings in the following proposition.*^
(since A' < 3, the banks in 2?""^'^'"*'''" (p) have sufficient hquid reserves at date 1) leads to
,
^ {l-y)R-{l-Q)h -(h-x):
vo
<
^3^ = yo [('1 -x)z].
Note also that condition (18) implies yg — ^o — Vo ^"^^ thus rules out precautionary insolvencies by
the above steps.
^Given the possibility of precautionary insolvencies, one maj' also wonder whether there could be
multiple equilibria due to banks' coordination failures. Suppose, for example, K = 3, so that the crisis is
contained after 3 banks fail. Could there also be a bad equilibrium in which all banks recall the maximum
level of loans, and their recall decisions are justified since their forward neighbors also recall the maximum
level of loans and experience a precautionary insolvency (thus paying a small ql)7
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Proposition 3. Suppose assumptions (FS), (16) and (17) are satisfied and conditions
(8), (12), (14) hold. Suppose also that condition (23) (which is the opposite of condition
(18) J holds. For a given financial network h{p), let i = p~^ (j) denote the slot of the
distressed bank.
(i) For the ex-ante equilibrium (at date 0): Each bank V E [bP^^ ,hP^-^\hP'''-'^'i] c
Qknow
^p^ recalls the saine level of loans yj^{p) = yfj j^^^ {p) as it would recall m the free-
information benchmark, while each bank V 6 ^uncertain ^^-^ recalls y^ip) = Vofreeip)'
which is what the bank 6''('~'^) would recall in the free-information benchmark. The bank
V 6 6''('+^) recalls y^ (p) < y^ just enough to avert insolvency.
(ii) For the continuation equilibrium (at date \): The equilibrium allocation
{'Ti (p) ! ?2 (p)} ^^ distance based and monotonic. There exists a unique
K E [A', 2n — 1] such that banks <bP^^\ ..,bP^'~^^~^)) > are insolvent while banks
JljP[i-h)^^^^l^p{i-{2n-i)) I
^^g solvent. The cascade size K is potentially larger than the
cascade size K in the free-information benchmark. In particular, there are two cases:
If K < 3, then each bank V G QunceTtam ^^^ chooses some y^ {p) < y^, and avoids a
precautionary insolvency. The cascade size m this case is identical to the free-information
benchmark, i.e. K = K.
•(f A' > 4, then each bank b' G B^^^^^^"^^"^ (p) chooses j/q (p) = y^ > y^ . which may lead
to a precautionary insolvency. There are two sub-cases:
U yo £ (yo [0] , 1 — y], a^^ banks y G 5""c«''*'^»" (p) are insolvent and the cascade
size is given by K = 2?! — 1 > A' > 4.
If yo € (yo'^o [0]]' there exists a unique x [yo] £ (^i ^TJo/PAi) characterized by
Eq. (24) such that bank V € 5 ""•=<='''<»*"• (p) is insolvent if and only if its forward neighbor's
payment is below x [yo]- The cascade size is an intermediate level K G [A', 27T. — 1],
Discussion. Figure 5 plots the cascade size K as a function of 6, for different levels of
the flexibility parameter yo. For comparison, the dashed lines plot the cascade size K in
the free-information benchmark for the same parameters. The top panel corresponds to
the case in which yo < yj, i.e. when condition (18) holds. By Proposition 2, in this case
This kind of coordination failure is not possible in our setup, precisely because of conditions (12) and
(14). Tliese conditions ensure tliat bank 6''*^'+'-^ is always solvent, even if all other banks choose the
maximum level of loans and experience precautionary insolvencies. To see this, note that the losses from
cross-deposits decrease as we move away from the distressed bank and eventually g''f'+2' >
'i — 13/ z.
Since bank fe''('+i) expects to receive at least /j — P/z from its forward neighbor, it can avoid insolvency
by choosing an intermediate level of loan recalls. Hence, it is never optimal for bank 6''('+i) to undergo a
precautionary insolvency. But once we fix g^('+') = ci, the rest of the equilibrium is uniquely determined
as described above, that is, there is no coordination failure among banks.
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Figure 5: The costly-audit equilibrium with self-inflicted bank runs. Each one
of the four panels plots the cascade size K as a function of 9 for a different level of the
flexibility parameter yo (i>^ increasing order of yo from top to bottom). The dashed lines
plot the cascade size K in the free-information benchmark.
there are no precautionary insolvencies and the cascade size is the same as the cascade
size in the free-information benchmark. The second panel corresponds to a higher level
of yo that satisfies yo > Vo- Ii^ this case, precautionary insolvencies are possible, and for
sufficiently large 6 more banks are insolvent in the costly audit benchmark than in the
free-information benchmark, i.e. K > K. The third panel shows that, as we increase
yo, a sufficiently large shock 6 may trigger a collapse of the whole financial system (i.e.,
A' = 2n- 1).
The bottom panel in Figure 5 shows that as yo continues to rise, then at some point the
amplification disappears and again A' = A'. That is, the effect of the flexibility parameter
yo on the size of the cascade K is non-monotonic: The whole financial system collapses
with an intermediate level of yo, but the health of the financial system is restored (and, in
fact, is stronger) with sufficiently high levels of yo. The intuition for this non-monotonicity
is the same as the intuition for the non-monotonic effect of yo on J^. Increasing the
flexibility parameter yo reduces the cascade size A' in the free-information benchmark. If
this increase in flexibility is not sufficiently large. A" does not fall to manageable levels
and the financial panic remains. As long as there is a financial panic, the increase in
yo backfires and, in the current case, it also amplifies the cascade by generating more
precautionary insolvencies. However, if the increase in yo is sufficiently large, it may end
the financial panic and restore the health of the financial system.
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6 Final Remarks
Our model captures what appears to be a central feature of financial panics: During
severe financial crises the complexity of the environment rises dramatically, and this in
itself causes confusion and financial retrenchment. The perception of counterparty risk
arises even in transactions among apparently sound financial institutions engaged in long
term relationships. All of the sudden, economic agents are faced with massive uncertainty
as things are no longer business-as-usual. The collapse of Lehman Brothers during the
current financial crisis is one such instance, which froze essentially all private credit mar-
kets and triggered massive run downs of credit lines and withdrawals even from the safest
money market funds.
In the model we capture the complexity of the environment with the size of the partial
cascades. When these cascades are small, banks only need to understand the financial
health of their immediate neighbors to make their decisions. In contrast, when financial
conditions worsen and cascades grow, banks need to understand and be informed about a
larger share of the network. At some point, this is simply too costly and banks withdraw
from intermediation rather than risk exposure to enormous uncertainty, which triggers a
flight to quality.
We also showed that banks' flexibility, defined as their ability to terminate long term
loans or sell illiquid assets while in distress, makes it harder for large cascades to develop,
but if they do develop they can trigger more severe credit crunches and even a collapse
in the financial system. Intuitively, a gain in flexibility is very useful if it succeeds in
containing panic, but it can be counterproductive if it does not as it facilitates banks'
withdrawal from intermediation.
An aspect we did not explore in this paper but one which we are currently pursuing
in a related work, is that of secondary markets for loans at date 0. Our preliminary
findings point to yet another amplification aspect of the mechanism we highlight in this
paper: With full information, the distant banks (i.e., the banks with k > K) are the
natural buyers of the loans sold by the distressed banks. However, once distant banks
face uncertainty and become worried that they may be too close to the distressed bank,
they cease to buy loans from these banks as they would rather hoard their liquidity, which
exacerbates the network's distress.
There are some obvious policy conclusions that emerge from our framework. For ex-
ample, there is clearly scope for having banks hold a larger bufi'er than they would be
privately inclined to do. Also, transparency measures, by reducing the cost of gathering
information, increase the resilience of the system to a lengthening in potential cascades.
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There is even an argument to limit banks' flexibility to undo their financial positions.
However, we are interested in going beyond these observations, and in particular in ex-
ploring the impact of policies that modify the structure of the network. For example,
there is an emerging consensus that the prevalence of bilateral OTC markets for CDS
transactions compounded the confusion and complexity of the current financial crisis,
and that it is imperative to organize these transactions in well capitalized exchanges to
prevent a recurrence. Our frameM'ork can help with the formal analysis of this type of
policy considerations. W'e leave this analysis for future research.
7 Appendix
Equilibrium in the Normal Environment. We claim that, in the normal environ-
ment described in Section 2.1, the equilibrium with the uncertain financial network facili-
tates hquidity flow and enables each bank b^ to pay the contracted values [ql = li,q^2 — h)
in each state of the world. Suppose that a consistent financial network, b (p), is realized
at date —1 and state s (r) is realized at date 0, and suppose without loss of generality that
red type banks are assigned to odd slots (the case in which red type banks are assigned to
even slots is symmetric). It suffices to prove the statement for this case since the case in
which s {g) is realized is symmetric to the s [r) case, and the case in which s (0) is realized
is tri^^al.
We conjecture (and verify below) that each bank bP chooses not to audit (for anj'
positive audit costs d{.) > 0) and not to recall any loans, i.e. a-' = and y^ — 0.
Consider the equilibrium at date 1. A red type bank, 6^'^'"-'\ (which is assigned to an
odd slot by assumption) needs liquidity so it draws its deposits from the forward neighbor
bank, i.e. chooses ^''(^i-i) _ ^_ p^j. q^q]^ green type bank, 6'''^'', regardless of the financial
network in B'''^-'^ (p), drawing ;^*~'^ € [0, c] deposits leads to the payments (j''^"'' = /j and
p(20 _ (l-y)i? + c^C^"/^ + (c-z^(^-))/2
92 — '-. •
1 - iOi
Since lo > h and the preferences are given by (3), the green type banks do not draw
their deposits regardless of their beliefs /^(-') (.
| p), i.e. they choose ~''(2') = 0. It follows
that liquidity flows through the network at date 1 even though each bank is uncertain
about the network structure. In particular, for each bank V, there is a no-liquidation
equilibrium at date 1 (cf. Eq. (4)) and the bank pays [ql = li.ql — I2)
We next consider the equilibrium at date and verify our conjecture that the banks
27
choose not to audit and not to recall any loans. First note that a bank f^^^ in need of
liquidity at date 1 is able to obtain it by withdrawing its deposits in the forward neighbor
at a cost of U/lj units at date 2 for each unit of liquidity. The bank could also obtain
liquidity bj' recalling loans at date but this would cost R > h/h units for each unit of
liquidity (since R > I2 > h > I)- Therefore, each bank 6^^'^ optimally chooses not to recall
any loans at date 0. Second note that a bank's, b^^'\ optimal actions (for loan recall at
date and deposit withdrawal at date 1) only depend on its slot i (and only on its parity),
and in particular, it is independent of the financial network in B''*'^ (p). Thus the bank
does not benefit from auditing and optimally chooses not to audit, a''*'' — (whenever
d{.) > 0), thus verifying our conjecture. This completes the proof of our claim that,
in the normal environment, the financial network facilitates liquidity flow across banks
and enables each bank IP to pay the contracted values [ql — li,q2 = h) hi each aggregate
state.
Proof of Eq. (6) for Sections 3 and 4. We claim that all cross-deposits are fully
withdrawn, i.e. Eq. (6) holds, in both the free-information benchmark analyzed in Sec-
tion 3 and the costly audit model analyzed in Section 4. By condition (8), the original
distressed bank, 6''*'', is insolvent thus it withdraws all of its deposits, i.e. 2^^'^ = z.
Suppose that, for some k E {0, .., 277 — 1}, bank 6''''"''"""''^^^ withdraws all of its deposits in
bank 6'^('""'=). We claim that bank 6^('~''') also withdraws deposits, i.e. -''('"'"*) = ~, which
proves Eq. (6) by induction.
To prove the claim, we first consider the free-information benchmark and analyze two
cases in turn. As the first case, suppose that the forward neighbor of bank 6^^'"''") is
insolvent (i.e. it pays qf'^''-'^^'^ < /^ and
g^^'""""^**
= 0). Recall that bank b''^''''^ is smaU
and takes the payment of its forward neighbor as given (see footnote 1), in particular,
it cannot potentially bail out its forward neighbor by withdrawing less than z. This
further implies that the bank withdraws all of its deposits from its forward neighbor, i.e.
^p{i-k)
_
^_ ^g y^g ggcond case, suppose that the forward neighbor bank, b^('-('=-i)), is
solvent, i.e. q'^ — /j. In this case, bank 6^('~*-') needs liquidity z (to pay its backward
neighbor) and it can obtain this liquidity either by withdrawing its deposits, which costs
/2//1 units at date 2 per unit of liquidity, or by recalling loans, which costs R > I2/I1 units
per unit of liquidity. Since the former is a cheaper way to obtain liquidity, bank 6''('^'^)
withdraws all of its deposits from its forward neighbor, proving our claim that ;p('"'^~) = -.
Next consider the costly audit model of Section 4. Recall that bank 6'''^'"''' makes
the deposit \\'ithdrawal decision before the resolution of uncertainty for cross-deposits
(see Figure 2). As the first case, suppose that bank 6^('''^) assigns a positive probability
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to a network structure b (/5) such that q^ {p) < h (that is, suppose the bank
assigns a positive probability tliat its forward neighbor will be insolvent). Since the bank
takes the pa^mient of its forward neighbor as given and its preferences are given by the
LeontiefF form in (17), in this case the bank necessarily withdraws all of its deposits, i.e.
r.p(i-k) ^ ._ -^Qy.^ suppose bank f^'-''^ believes that g^^'-C^-i') (p) = [^ with probability 1
(that is, the bank knows that its forward neighbor is solvent). In this case, as in the free-
information benchmark, the bank withdraws z^^''^^ = z to meet its liquidity obligations
to its backward neighbor. This completes the proof of the claim and proves Eq. (6) by
induction.
Proof of Proposition 1. Contained in the discussion preceding the proposition.
Characterization of Banks' Payment Functions qi [i/o,x] and q2 [y'o-^] in Section
4. If bank b''<'~'^) chooses some j/q € [Oi Vo] at date 0, and its forward neighbor pays
X = (?i
~ ~ {p) at date 1 (and if condition (18) holds), then this bank's payment is
giA^en by functions qj [yQ.x] and 92 Wo-'^] which are characterized as follows:
Case 1. If X £ [/j — ,5/c, l\] and y'^ > {li — x) z, then
; , y'o-{h-x)z + il-y-y',)R ^^
q-i = h and 92 = 1 > h- (25
1 — UJ
Case 2. If x < li - p/z or j/q < {li - x) z, then
y + y'o + zx
qi = < Ij and q-i = 0. (26)
The first case characterizes the payment when the bank's losses from cross-deposits do
not exceed its buffer and the bank has recalled enough loans to counter these losses. In
this case, the bank is solvent and pays according to (25). The second case characterizes
the payment when the bank's losses from cross-deposits exceed its buffer, or when the
losses do not exceed the buffer but the bank has not recalled enough loans to counter
these losses. In this case, the bank is insolvent and pays according to (26).
Proof of Proposition 2. First consider part (i) taking as given the characterization
of the loan recall decisions in part (ii). Note that the loan recall decision of each bank
depends only on its distance from the distressed bank, which implies that the payments of
banks in the continuation equilibrium can be written as a function of their distances, i.e.
that the equilibrium is distance based. The characterization in part (ii) shows that each
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bank b"^'-'"''
€
{bP^'\ bP^'-'^\
..,
6''(^-*^-i»} that would be insolvent in the free-information
benchmark chooses y^ = yo, and thus it pays the same allocation it would pay in the
free-information benchmark:
Qi [fc] = <liTree ip) < ^1 ^nd Q2 [k] = q',%'^ (p) = for /c 6 {0, .., K - 1} . (27)
Tlie bank b''^^~^^ recalls at least as many loans as it would recall in the free-information
benchmark, thus it is solvent given condition (18) (which ensures that recalling too many
loans does not cause insolvency) and pays (cf. Eq. (25));
Qi{K] = h and Q2[K]>h. (28)
The banks b^^'-''^
€
|5p('-(/<+i)),6p(^-(a'+2))_
..^
bP(»-(2n-i))
j ^^^ solvent and thus pay (cf.
Eq. (25)):
Qi [k] = h and Q2 [k] = ^- z '— > h, for k e [K + 1, .., 2n - 1} .
1 — to
(29)
In particular, the size of the cascade is K as it is in the free-information benchmark. Since
'ii free (p) ^^ increasing in A: (see Proposition 1), the characterization in (27) through (29)
also implies that the payments, Qi [k] and Q2 [k], are increasing in k and proves that the
distance based equilibrium is monotonic.
We next turn to loan recaU decisions at date and prove that the choices prescribed
in part (ii) are optimal. Consider first the banks in B^^°^ (p). Comparing the charac-
terization of the continuation equilibrium in (27) through (29) to the characterization in
Proposition 1, each bank b' E 5'="°"' (^) expects to receive the same payment from its
forward neighbor compared to what it would receive in the free-information benchmark
(i.e. each bank b^ 6 Bknow{p) g^j^^g problem (20) with x"" = Qij'^ee'^''^)- Thus it also
recalls the same level of loans that it would recall in the free-information benchmark.
Next we consider a bank b^ e S""^^'""'*" (p) which solves problem (20) with x"" = Qi [2].
We claim that Qi [2] characterized in Eqs. (27) through (29) is equal to
^i f^ee (^^e
payment of the forward neighbor of bank 6''^*"'^^ in the free-information benchmark), which
in turn proves that the bank b^ recalls the same level of loans y^ Z.^1 that b^'^''"'^^ would
recall in the free-information benchmark. To prove the claim that Qi [2] = Qi flee^ ^^^^
suppose that K < 2. Note that in this case Qi [2] is given by Eq. (28) or Eq. (29) and in
either case Qi [2] — li. Note that by Proposition 1, (?j J^^g = ^1 when K < 2, proving the
claim in this case. Next suppose K > 3 and note that in this case Qj [2] is given by Eq.
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(27) which shows Qi [2] = g^'j^^e {p), completing the proof of part (ii). '
The characterization for the aggregate level of recalled loans for the cases K < 2, K = 3
and K > 4 then trivially follow from part (ii) and Proposition 1, thus completing the proof.
Proof of Proposition 3. Most of the proof is contained in the discussion preceding
the proposition. Here, we consider in turn the subcases 1 and 2 (for case K > A) and we
verify the claims in the main text. We also verify the conjecture that the equilibrium is
distance based and monotonic.
Subcase 1. If yo € (j/q [0] , 1 - y], then
.
'
- yo > yS [0] > yo [(^1 - ^) ~~]
for any x E [OJi]. This implies that all banks in {6''*'', ..., 6^''"^^""^^^} are insolvent since
they recall loans greater than their corresponding upper limits. These banks' payments
are characterized by the system of equations
qf-'^ = / (gf-e--^^) for each k € {l, .., 2n - 2} , (30)
where / (.) is defined in Eq. (11) and the initial condition gf ' is given by Eq. (9) (after
pluggmgm q[' ' = h).
By condition (12), the solution to the above system is increasing (and converges to
the fixed point y + yo < 1 < 'i)) verifying our conjecture that the equilibrium is distance
based and monotonic. By condition (14), we have K < 2n — 2, which imphes q^ "~"'' >
(jj
~ ~
'' =
(?i
!-~gg
~
. Then, since bank b^'^''^'' in the free-information benchmark is
able to avert insolvency by choosing some y^ j^^l < J/q, the informed bank
6''('+i) in this
case can also avert insolvency by choosing some yg < j/o- It follows that the cascade
size is K = 2n — l^ which is greater than the free-information cascade size K (under
condition (14)), completing the characterization of the date 1 equilibrium in this case.
Subcase 2. If yo G iyo^Vo [0])i there exists a unique x [yo] G (^i — y^/zji), character-
ized in Eq. (24) and increasing in yo, such that a bank b^ € j^uncertain ^^^ jg insolvent
if and only if receives from its forward neighbor x <
.^[yo]. Using the conjecture that
the equilibrium is distance based and monotonic, we further conjecture that the banks
hp^'^.^b^i'-i^-'))] are insolvent while the banks jft^^'-^), .., 6^('-(2"-i))| are solvent.
The payments of the banks in < f^'^ .., b'^^''^ '~vj I are characterized by
^p,.-., ^ J
(gM-.«-.;;
) fo^. ^^^h i^ e
^
1^ ..^ A' - 1
^ ,
(31)
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which is an increasing sequence (by condition (12)). Then, either (?f
"~
< x [yo] and
we are back to subcase 1 (i.e. K — 2n — 1), or there exists a unique K 6 [K, 2n — 1] such
that
5:<'-<''^^»<
a- 15.1
<,:"-('--»
(32)
In the latter case, the banks in jfe''^'-^), .., 6K'-(^'-0)| c 5""='="*°'" (/s) are insolvent
(since the}' receive less than x [yo] from their forward neighbor) but the bank 6'''-'" '
is solvent since it receives at least x [yo] from its forward neighbor. The banks in
J t)^l'~r^+^j)j
..,
tp(i-(2n-2)) I g^j.g g^^gQ solvent since the)' receive li > x [yo] from their for-
ward neighbors. The informed bank 6^^'"*"^^ is also solvent as in subcase 1. Finally, this
analysis implies that the equilibrium is distance based and monotonic, completing the
characterization of the date 1 equilibrium in this case.
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